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preexisting conditions; and placing limits on the extent to which premiums can vary by age, sex, 
or health status. This study assesses the effectiveness of such regulatory reforms in seven states. The 
authors endorse reforms that deal with availability and affordability, including requiring insurers to 
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standardized benefits; limiting permissible rating factors and rate variation; and most important, 
finding ways to insure individuals through the group market. 
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CASE STUDY: IOWA 
(State with Weaker Regulation) 
 
Key Quotes 
“Short-term goals have been achieved: portability, preexisting condition protection, and 
stability of the industry; but the longer-term goal, making individual health insurance 
affordable, has not been successful.” 
Former insurance regulator 
 
“We don’t close a block of business; we try to reward people who stay healthy. After the first 
year, the healthy people (those with an individual medical loss ratio below 16 percent) pay 
only 93 percent of the general rate increase, while those in poorer health (with an individual 
medical loss ratio higher than 71 percent) will pay 107 percent of the general rate increase. 
This keeps healthy people in the block rather than shopping around after the first year, and it 
puts a cap on how much their experience will affect those in poor health. This way we do not 
have to close the block with all the sick people and open a new block for the healthy people 
the way our competitors do.” 
Commercial insurer 
 
“We offer coverage to those who apply 65 to 70 percent of the time, but many agents know 
our underwriting guidelines so they won’t even go through the application process with us for 
some of their clients. We impose exclusions or riders for 35 percent of those we do accept.” 
Same commercial insurer 
 
Overview of State Regulatory Reforms 
Iowa instituted individual market reforms in 1996 and modified them slightly in 1997 to 
comply with HIPAA. The reforms passed in 1996 included: 
 
• Portability provisions—people with group coverage can change jobs or insurers 
without undergoing a new exclusion period; people with prior group coverage 
must be offered a basic or standard individual policy, as long as they apply within two 
months of the end of their group coverage; and anyone in the high-risk pool can 
transfer to individual coverage after one year without preexisting condition riders. 
• Rating restrictions—these involve restrictions on rate variations among blocks of 
business for the same carrier, but do not limit rate variations within a block of 
business. In essence, the maximum rate variation across the block midpoint rates 
are limited to 2:1 (with further variation permitted to adjust for any differences in 
benefits). Annual rate increases for one block cannot be any more than 15 percent 
greater than for another block. The intention of these restrictions is to prohibit 
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carriers from closing blocks of business and opening new ones as a way to keep 
premiums lower for new, healthier applicants. 
• Standardized plans—every insurer in the individual market was required to offer a basic 
(few benefits) plan and a standard plan. Carriers may also offer other benefit packages.  
• A mandatory risk-adjustment system—this system spreads the cost of the 
guaranteed-issue basic and standard products more broadly. Individual carriers 
experiencing medical loss ratios of less than 90 percent must subsidize those carriers 
that have medical loss ratios above 90 percent. If the aggregate loss ratio on basic 
and standard plans exceeds 90 percent, then all group health insurers in Iowa, 
including certain self-funded groups, are assessed an amount sufficient to bring the 
aggregate medical loss ratio on guaranteed-issue business down to 90 percent. 
 
Iowa already had established a high-risk pool, which reached an enrollment of 
2,100 at its pre-reform peak in 1992. Known as the Iowa Comprehensive Health 
Association (ICHA), the high-risk pool charges rates that are 150 percent of the average 
market rate of the top five carriers, and the products offered were the basic and standard 
plans. Pool participation dropped in the post-reform period as the portability provisions 
enabled people to move from the small group to the individual market without rejection or 
exclusions. There were fewer than 200 participants in ICHA as of 2003. After 12 months 
in the pool, enrollees can obtain guaranteed issue in the individual market from any 
carrier. ICHA is subsidized by an assessment on all insurance carriers; the assessment is an 
offset to the premium tax required of all insurance carriers. The total subsidy in 2003 was 
roughly $2.5 million. The premium on the least expensive product available in the high-
risk pool would consume 30 percent of the income of a 25-year-old male at 200 percent 
of FPL, and 84 percent of the income of a 63-year-old couple at 200 percent of FPL. 
 
The products available in the individual market, while generally less expensive 
than those of the high-risk pool, are still very expensive for older and/or sicker people. A 
healthy 60-year-old in Iowa would pay nearly three times the rate of a healthy 25-year-
old. A 60-year-old who had to buy coverage through the high-risk pool would pay a rate 
more than nine times the rate of the healthy 25-year-old, the second-highest range of the 
seven states we reviewed. 
 
Rate regulation is weak and difficult to enforce. As one regulator pointed out, 
“We don’t have the expertise to know if the benefit adjustment factors are reasonable. We 
can’t afford the specialized knowledge we need to evaluate this. The rate increase limit is 
relatively easy to verify but the benefit adjustment factors are a black hole.” 
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Insurers also have found ways to bypass rate restrictions altogether. As one 
commercial carrier explained, “We have a ‘group trust,’ which is a way to sign up 
individuals as group members under a master state policy. We file the rates in Iowa but the 
Iowa regulators don’t have jurisdiction over them. This lets us get rate increases when we 
want to, in a timely way. All of our individual products in Iowa are sold through the 
group trust. In other states, we use associations to accomplish the same purpose.” 
 
Wellmark Blue Cross Blue Shield, the dominant carrier in the individual market in 
Iowa, is profitable according to industry observers and available data. (See Exhibit 1 for 
Wellmark’s medical loss ratio history.) The underwriting profit on Wellmark’s individual 
product sold through the Farm Bureau is not allowed to exceed a certain low percent1 
based on private negotiations between the two parties. The Farm Bureau individual 
product insures roughly 35,000 to 40,000 members, and its premium rates are roughly 16 
percent below the market rates for individual coverage. 
 
Wellmark has a dominant market share of roughly 60 percent of the individual 
market, a figure that has not changed since the 1996 reforms. It has a 95 percent share of 
the individuals enrolled in basic or standard products, and these people receive premium 
subsidies from other carriers. This “risk assessment” subsidy for basic and standard products 
was close to $17 million to $18 million in 2002, an amount that sometimes attracts 
complaints from the other carriers who must pay it. It was estimated to equal roughly 0.8 
percent of individual premiums overall. The carriers themselves, however, wrote the 
legislation that requires the risk assessment, and so their complaints have not grown into a 
full-fledged revolt. 
  
As one former insurance industry policymaker concluded, “The reforms of 1996 
did not address affordability. We need a much bigger effort to get that. Iowa is experiencing 
high cost inflation in health. It may be time for another health reform council focused on 
affordability and access. Iowa has a very good public policy infrastructure. People have to 
take fairly centrist positions or they won’t get much political traction. They can’t be 
bomb-throwers. Health care reform is based on finding common ground.” 
 
Exhibit 1. Medical Loss Ratios for the Individual and Total Insurance 
Business of Dominant Carrier in Iowa 
    After reform 
   Before reform 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Iowa Wellmark-IA Individual 81.5% 88.9% 98.8% 86.6% 82.4% 83.3%
  Total 85.0% 86.4% 89.3% 87.1% 85.5% 84.4%
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
  4
CASE STUDY: KANSAS 
(State with Weaker Regulation) 
 
Key Quotes 
“Each company has its own quirky underwriting rules: some are very strict about height-
weight requirements, others don’t like any history of cancer, some reject for asthma or diabetes 
or high blood pressure, some won’t take anyone who takes anti-depressant medication or has 
ever done any therapy. . . . Essentially, you have to be squeaky clean to be guaranteed of 
getting coverage from most of them. . . . We sometimes refer to the insurer underwriting 
departments as the ‘new business prevention departments.’” 
An insurance agent 
 
“For applicants we accept, we use four rating tiers: better-than-average risk, average risk, 
some history of a medical problem, or a chronic problem that can be controlled . . . there’s 
about a 20 percent difference in rates from one tier to another.” 
An insurance company 
 
“Our individual block of business is doing very well . . . it’s much more profitable than our 
large-group or small-group business . . . we have done well with the regulators in terms of 
rate increases. . . . They know that Kansas will only have a good market for individual 
health insurance when it makes business sense for insurers . . . we need to do OK 
financially.” 
The same insurance company 
 
Overview 
Beyond the requirements imposed by HIPAA, Kansas has not enacted any significant 
regulatory reforms in its individual health insurance market. The state has no guaranteed-
issue requirements. Carriers are permitted to accept or reject applicants for coverage and 
impose preexisting condition exclusions. Waiting periods of up to two years can be 
imposed for preexisting conditions. Carriers may use a wide range of rating factors, 
including age, gender, and health status, with no limitations on rate variations.2 The state’s 
dominant carrier, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, reports that it rejects approximately 
20 percent of applicants. The company also imposes a waiting period of 240 days for 
several conditions (such as urinary tract infections, gallbladder problems, hernias) but this 
period is reduced by any prior creditable coverage. BCBS varies premiums based on 
individual health status, using four different rating tiers. 
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Kansas has a high-risk pool called the Kansas Health Insurance Association 
(KHIA). Coverage from KHIA is available to state residents who have been rejected for 
coverage by two different carriers, or who have been offered individual coverage with a 
permanent exclusion for a preexisting condition. Benefits are considerably worse than 
those available in the commercial market and exclude coverage of preexisting conditions 
for up to 90 days. Premiums are set to be 125 percent to 150 percent of the average rates 
available from commercial carriers and can vary by age. The premium on the least 
expensive product available in the high-risk pool would absorb 8 percent of the income of 
a 25-year-old male at 200 percent of FPL, and 24 percent of the income of a 63-year-old 
couple at 200 percent of FPL. KHIA covers fewer than 2,000 residents of Kansas, largely 
because of its high rates. Losses on the high-risk pool are quite low and are funded 
through an assessment on the state’s commercial insurers. 
 
BCBS has approximately 50 percent of the individual market.3 About a dozen 
other commercial insurers also market actively in Kansas. As shown in Exhibit 1 below, 
BCBS’s medical loss ratio has ranged from 78 percent to 85 percent over recent years. 
Since the company does not use agents or brokers, and therefore pays no commissions, it 
is likely that individual health insurance is quite profitable for BCBS of Kansas. 
 
Exhibit 1. Medical Loss Ratios for the Individual Line of Business: 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Medical Loss Ratio 78% 85% 82% 85% 83% 80% 
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
 
Affordability and erosion of health insurance coverage are major concerns in 
Kansas, although few observers see any promising solutions on the horizon. According 
to one insurance regulator, “These problems are not going to get better. More and 
more small groups are dropping coverage, which is putting more pressure on the 
individual market. There is a lot of support for an individual mandate, and making people 
personally responsible for providing insurance for their families. But before we do that, we 
need to find ways to make coverage more affordable, including getting consumers more 
actively involved in health care cost containment. . . . We are sort of disappointed that the 
high-risk pool assessment is going down, because it takes pressure off the insurers to want 
to find solutions.” 
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CASE STUDY: KENTUCKY 
(State with Weaker Regulation and Rollback of Stronger Reforms) 
 
Key Quotes 
“It is not good for a state to be a guinea pig on a national issue.” 
Legislative staff 
 
“The high-risk pool is only helpful to people with chronic conditions who have money. They 
used to be in Anthem [Blue Cross] where they paid a lot less than they do [in the high-risk 
pool] today.” 
Consumer advocate 
 
“When we switched to guaranteed issue, complaints switched from the sick to complaints 
from the healthy.” 
Insurance regulator 
 
“The 2000 reforms signaled positive signs of competition. This is good for healthy 
consumers, but not so great for unhealthy consumers.’’ 
Another insurance regulator 
 
Overview 
In 1993, then-Governor Brereton Jones called a special legislative session to reform health 
care. As the first governor to support President Clinton in the primaries, he shared similar 
political goals and even some of the same political consultants. Jones’s plan was to mirror 
what the Clinton administration proposed. He focused on purchasing alliances, 
standardized benefit plans (modeled on fairly benefit-rich indemnity coverage), modified 
community rating (rating criteria allowed for age but not gender or health status, and rates 
were subject to a 3:1 rate band), guaranteed issue, portability, and shorter periods (six 
months) for preexisting condition exclusions. 
 
With a legislature that met only for four months every two years, the reform 
legislation process went very quickly in 1994. Political buy-in, however, was never 
achieved, and the reforms were never fully implemented. Reprieves on converting 
existing policies into the standardized, community-rated policies required by the 1994 
reforms were extended through 1997. In effect, only new entrants to the individual 
market were buying reformed products.4 As a result, more than two-thirds of the 
individual market was left out of the reformed products. Sick new enrollees switched to 
reform products for the better rates and more comprehensive coverage, which imposed all 
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their costs on a small pool of healthy new enrollees. Rates for the reform products rose 
astronomically for the healthy. 
 
In 1995, 31 commercial carriers left the state, affecting roughly 30,000 individual 
enrollees. In 1996, another ten carriers left, affecting another 34,000. Most of these 
enrollees were healthy. Prior to reform, there were only three carriers in the individual 
market with more than 10,000 enrollees, and Anthem always had at least 80 percent of the 
market. As one active insurer in the market commented, “We are of mixed opinion 
whether a lot more carriers in the market is good. There are usually only three or four real 
players in every state, even though 30 to 40 might be present. The [marginal players] go 
after the healthy, they open and close pools regularly, hitting sicker enrollees with big rate 
increases to get rid of them. Industry conduct regulations aren’t a bad idea.” 
 
Despite this reality, as one consumer advocate complained, “Kentucky has created 
a folklore that competition is necessary to control costs, and that the reforms were 
examples of excessive government regulation.” 
 
The purchasing alliance never got off the ground. It originally was mandated for all 
public workers at state, local, state university, and school board levels and launched with 
more than 300,000 lives.5 The 1996 legislated rollbacks, however, left only retired state 
employees in the purchasing alliance. Meanwhile, individuals were allowed to buy in to 
the standard plan at group rates. This program became Kentucky Care, and within two 
years it went bankrupt. 
 
Very few people bought modified community rating and standardized plans, which 
were considered a national threat by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA). 
The trade group launched a well-funded advertising campaign to discredit these reforms. 
By 1996, insurers were permitted to issue nonstandard plans, and the rating band spread 
was increased to 5:1, with preexisting condition exclusion periods extended to 12 months. 
These changes did not stop more commercial carriers from leaving the state. 
 
In 1998, the legislature eliminated most of the restrictions on product design and 
rating, abolished the Health Purchasing Alliance, and established a stop-loss pool for high-
risk individuals insured by the carriers. The Guaranteed Acceptance Program (GAP) was 
funded by an assessment on carriers that did not offer coverage to GAP-eligible individuals. 
Roughly 3,000 individuals enrolled over time. But the program soon was replaced by the 
Kentucky Access Program, a high-risk pool created by the legislature in 2000. 
 
The 1998 reforms were meant to attract carriers back into the market and reduce 
rates for the healthy enrollees of existing carriers. Rate reductions did not materialize. But 
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Humana, a national insurer based in Kentucky, did enter the individual market in 
Kentucky for the first time in 1998. 
 
The Kentucky Access Program (KAP) began in January 2001. It continued the 
GAP funding mechanism of premium assessments and received a subsidy from the state’s 
tobacco settlement funds. This program did help bring four more carriers into Kentucky, 
although most are reported to be fairly inactive, marketing mostly very high-deductible 
and short-term policies. KAP enrolls about 75 new eligibles per month and has a very 
high turnover rate because it is viewed as a “parking place between group insurance or 
death.” KAP generally has about 1,000 enrollees at any one time. New members generally 
have been rejected by carriers or have one of 35 “high-cost conditions” that make them 
eligible for KAP; fewer than one-half of 1 percent of members qualify for coverage based 
on HIPAA. Roughly 10 percent to 11 percent of enrollees join KAP because the 
premium quote from private carriers exceeded that of KAP. Premiums are set at 125 
percent of the market average. The pool originally was funded with roughly $19 million 
per year in premium assessment subsidies and approximately $10 million per year 
earmarked from the state’s tobacco settlement funds, although a large proportion of these 
earmarked funds were taken back for general fund use in 2002 and 2003.  
 
The Kentucky Access Program gets very mixed reviews. While growth rates in 
individual premiums have stabilized since its passage, some industry observers believe that 
the rate stabilization occurred because the legislature finally stopped changing the rules of 
the individual health insurance market. Consumer advocates are upset that tobacco funds 
are being used to subsidize the high-risk pool rather than to subsidize Medicaid 
enrollment. The percentage of uninsured in Kentucky has remained around 15 percent to 
16 percent despite all the changes in the individual market in recent years.  
 
Meanwhile, the medical loss ratio on the individual market business of the 
dominant carrier, Anthem, dropped below 70 percent after the 2000 reforms, compared to 
a range of 75 percent to 92 percent during the 1990s. This figure is better than their 
overall medical loss ratio of 81 percent to 82 percent before 2000 and is the lowest MLR 
in the individual business of any dominant carrier in the seven states we reviewed. 
 
At the same time, Kentucky has the highest premium rate differential of the seven 
states. The highest rate for a high-risk 60-year-old male is 14.6 times that of the lowest 
rate for a healthy 25-year-old male. The least expensive product in the individual market 
ranges from 3 percent of annual income for a 25-year-old male to 23 percent of annual 
income for a 63-year-old couple, calculated at an income of 200 percent of the federal 
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poverty level. In the high-risk pool, the least expensive product for the 25-year-old would 
absorb 18 percent of income, and for the 63-year-olds, 89 percent of income, calculated at 
an income of 200 percent of the federal poverty level. 
 
Perhaps the greatest gain of the reforms was that the state was temporarily rid of 
cherry-picking commercial insurance companies. There are products on the market for 
sick individuals, but they are generally not affordable in a state like Kentucky that has a 
large low-income population. As one state policymaker concluded, “Medicaid expansions 
may have done something for the uninsured but the individual insurance market reforms 
did nothing at the end of the day.” 
 
 
Exhibit 1. Enrollment in the Individual Insurance Market 
in the State of Kentucky 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Anthem* 51,867 58,749 58,053 87,913 85,502 81,954 88,990 88,166 82,462 92,947 
Kentucky Kare n/a n/a n/a 7,979 6,745 3,104 0 0 0 0 
Humana       n/a n/a 5,031 5,018 
Other**    75,000 n/a n/a n/a n/a 24,500 n/a 
Total    170,892     112,000  
* Enrollment for 1993 to 1998 includes members of Southeastern United MediGroup and SouthEastern Group. The two merged in 1998 to form 
Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield. 
** In 1996, 45 of the largest companies that left the market were covering about 75,000 individuals. By 2002, six carriers were selling policies in the 
individual market. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2. Concentration in the Individual Insurance Market 
in the State of Kentucky 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Largest Insurer  72.22% 54.24% 82.55% 86.02% 89.74% 100.00% 100.00% 94.25% 94.88%
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
 
 
Exhibit 3. Medical Loss Ratios for the Largest Carrier in the Individual 
and Total Insurance Market in the State of Kentucky 
    After reform 
   Before reform 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kentucky Anthem KY Individual 75.9% 55.6% 87.1% 76.8% 92.1% 83.5% 80.6% 69.2% 69.1%
  Total 75.8% 84.8% 94.3% 88.6% 85.0% 84.5% 80.5% 82.3% 80.8%
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
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CASE STUDY: MASSACHUSETTS 
(State with Stronger Regulation) 
 
Key Quotes 
“If the market has been structured to serve healthy people, any reforms to help the unhealthy 
will disadvantage the healthy. That’s the central tension and the major political dilemma and 
challenge with health insurance market reforms. Our market now works much better for 
unhealthy people but not as well as before for the young and healthy. . . . We have had to 
be constantly vigilant to resist attempts to undermine or roll back our reforms . . . and the 
pressures are intensifying because of rising health care costs.” 
Consumer advocate 
 
“Having big local carriers makes a huge difference. It lets the state resist the assault of 
national players who have a uniform agenda and want the same weak rules in every 
state . . . it’s easy to sink to the lowest common denominator unless the state has local 
carriers who can’t go anywhere.” 
State legislator 
 
“We find we can’t be creative in the individual market because it’s too regulated in terms of 
benefits. . . . Products are much more expensive than they need to be. It would be better to 
set a minimum floor on coverage and then let us be creative, like we can be in the small-
group market. . . . Some coverage is better than none.” 
Health insurance executive 
 
“Carriers are not marketing individual or small-group coverage actively in Massachusetts. 
The health plans like big glamorous accounts. They say they are afraid the markets will 
explode. The only risk of explosion I see is an explosion in insurer profits . . . coverage could 
be much more affordable if insurers did their jobs well.” 
Small business association executive 
 
Overview 
Individual market reforms were adopted in Massachusetts in 1996, with some subsequent 
modifications in 2000. The 1996 reforms were enacted largely as a result of the efforts of a 
coalition of consumer advocates, small business associations, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts (BCBSMA). Consumer advocates were concerned about availability of 
coverage, particularly for those with preexisting health conditions, as well as the lack of 
coverage for certain benefits, including prescription drugs. Small business associations were 
concerned about adverse selection, which was occurring because of different underwriting 
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rules in the small-group and individual insurance markets.6 BCBSMA wanted a “level 
playing field” for all carriers in the individual market and, in particular, to stem its financial 
losses on the individual line of business. Prior to reform, BCBSMA was the only carrier 
required to accept all applicants (although it could impose a waiting period of up to three 
years for preexisting conditions). Unlike other carriers, it was required to use community 
rating and to have its rates receive prior regulatory approval, after a lengthy and often 
contentious public rating hearing process. 
 
The major provisions of the 1996 reform law (Chapter 176M of the Massachusetts 
General Laws) were: mandatory participation in the individual market for carriers that 
covered more than 5,000 people in the state’s small-group market; guaranteed issue at least 
during the annual two-month open enrollment period (carriers could issue coverage at 
other times during the year, provided it was on a guaranteed-issue basis); guaranteed 
renewability; prohibition of preexisting condition exclusions and waiting periods; the 
adoption of three “actuarially equivalent” standardized benefit packages (medical, 
preferred provider, and managed care); and modified community rating, which permitted 
the use of age and geography for rating purposes subject to certain rating bands. Carriers 
were permitted to continue to maintain and renew individual plans that did not comply 
with the new reform law for a period of up to three years. 
 
The individual health insurance law was amended in 2000 in several significant 
ways. Carriers are now required to have continuous open enrollment to ensure availability 
at all times for consumers. To prevent adverse selection, carriers are permitted to impose 
up to a six-month exclusion or waiting period for preexisting conditions for applicants 
without prior insurance coverage. Self-employed people are now permitted to obtain 
coverage in either the individual or small-group markets, instead of being required to 
purchase in the small-group market. Carriers have been given flexibility to offer one 
benefit package in addition to the standardized products, although any nonstandard plan 
must receive prior regulatory approval and meet a range of regulatory requirements. 
Finally, the rate bands were expanded somewhat to permit greater variation in rates based 
on age (from a range of 1.5 to 1, to 2 to 1). 
 
Individual market reform appears to have been quite successful in Massachusetts in 
promoting availability of coverage while retaining some choice of carrier. The reforms 
were enacted with minimal market disruption. The link between participation in the 
small-group and individual markets seems to have been effective at keeping carriers in the 
market. The major carriers were local plans that could not withdraw from the market. A 
few commercial carriers left the small-group market because they did not want to sell 
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individual coverage, and a number of other carriers that had sold individual products 
decided not to sell the new guaranteed-issue plans. These carriers, however, had relatively 
few enrollees. 
 
As shown in Exhibits 1 and 2, enrollment in the individual market has declined 
dramatically and become sharply concentrated since reform. BCBSMA now has more than 
60 percent of members who have individual health insurance. Several factors seem to 
explain these market trends. First, the reform eliminated the ability of carriers to market 
short-term individual health insurance policies. These plans had covered a significant 
number of enrollees prior to reform, particularly younger people and those between jobs. 
Second, many self-employed people now purchase coverage in the small-group market, 
partly as a result of better public information about their ability to do so. Third, rising 
premiums and the growing unaffordability of health insurance coverage has no doubt 
contributed to the reduction in people with individual coverage. 
 
Market concentration has increased because of the weak rate regulatory standards 
in the law. A carrier’s individual health insurance rates in Massachusetts are subject to 
regulatory review only if they are more than two standard deviations above the average 
rates in the individual market. This weak standard permits rates for some carriers to be 
almost double the rates of other carriers for exactly the same standardized benefit package. 
The predictable result is that carriers with high premium rates have few or no individual 
enrollees, thereby allowing them to finesse the requirement to participate in the individual 
market. According to one consumer advocate, “The biggest concern in the reforms is that 
rate regulation is missing. However, there is little legislative appetite for adopting tougher 
standards.” Lastly, BCBSMA’s overall membership and share of the Massachusetts health 
insurance market has grown significantly in the past several years, in part because of the 
financial difficulties of several major competitors. 
 
The reforms had the financial effect BCBSMA had hoped for: the individual line 
of business has become quite profitable for the company, with a medical loss ratio of 85 
percent or less in most years since reform (Exhibit 3). Based on our interviews, other 
carriers have experienced similar financial results. 
 
Affordability of individual insurance coverage is a major issue in Massachusetts. 
Policymakers have responded by allowing carriers to market products with higher cost-
sharing (as high as an annual deductible of $5,000) and without coverage for prescription 
drugs, a benefit that is required in the standardized plans. 
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Exhibit 1. Enrollment in the Guaranteed-Issue Individual Insurance Market 
in the State of Massachusetts 
Carrier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
BCBSMA 40,800 38,600 28,272 27,390 25,804 27,848 31,473 
Harvard Pilgrim 29,800 20,232 23,370 18,648 13,231 9,593 8,128 
Others 64,763 67,351 42,522 28,909 16,233 11,693 11,693 
Total 135,363 126,183 94,164 74,947 55,268 50,911 51,294 
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
 
 
Exhibit 2. Market Share in the Individual Insurance Market 
in the State of Massachusetts 
Carrier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Largest carrier 30.1% 30.6% 30.0% 36.5% 46.7% 54.6% 61.3% 
Largest two insurers 52.2% 46.6% 54.8% 61.4% 70.6% 73.5% 77.2% 
Smallest 50% 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% 0.8% 2.0% 3.1% 2.7% 
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
 
 
Exhibit 3. Medical Loss Ratios for the Largest Carrier in the 
Individual and Total Insurance Market in the State of Massachusetts: 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
 
Average for 
three years 
prior to 
reform 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Individual line of business 90+% 75.8% 87.7% 90.4% 83.3% 84.4% 79.8% 
Total business 88.5% 80.2% 85.1% 85.2% 84.9% 85.2% 86.1% 
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
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CASE STUDY: WASHINGTON 
(State with Weaker Regulation and Rollback of Stronger Reforms) 
 
Key Quotes 
“The individual market just isn’t fixable at the state level.” 
Experienced Washington State policymaker 
 
“The only way to have a private individual insurance market is to exclude the sick.” 
Insurance broker for the small and individual market 
 
“You can’t just address one of the markets, the small-group or individual market, without 
realizing the problem will pop up somewhere else. People and their brokers will find the 
cheapest option. Insurers always are trying to keep these moles out of their holes. We call it 
‘Whack-a-Mole.’” 
Insurance company staff involved with individual and 
small group markets.7 
 
“The high-risk pool is not means-tested. While thousands of people with incomes above 125 
percent of Federal Poverty Level are being cut off the Basic Health Plan [a Medicaid 
expansion plan], the state is allowing a $30 million subsidy to support a couple of thousand 
people in WSHIP [the high-risk pool]. Only the sick who can afford the WSHIP premium 
can get into it. Who is more deserving of community assistance in paying for their care?” 
State legislative staffer involved in health care legislation 
 
Overview 
The reforms in Washington State that began in 1993 were intended to improve access to 
the individual and small-group markets, and in particular to improve access for high-risk 
individuals.8 They were passed in an era of anticipation of a national universal health 
program, under the sponsorship of a new Democratic governor and a Democratic-
controlled legislature with a comprehensive agenda for health reform. These efforts 
included the elimination of medical underwriting; elimination of riders and permanent 
exclusions for preexisting conditions; shortening the preexisting condition limitation to a 
three-month period, down from pre-reform periods of as long as two years; and the 
imposition of guaranteed-issue and guaranteed-renewal, community rating based on 
family size and geography only, and rate review. Another feature of the 1993 reforms was 
an employer mandate. Between 1993 and 1995, enrollment in the individual market grew 
from 218,000 to a peak of 296,000 enrollees (Exhibit 1). At the same time, in 1994 close 
to 30 insurers—mostly commercial carriers with very small market shares—cancelled their 
products and left the state. 
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Republicans took over control of the state legislature in 1994. The reforms of 
1995—largely rollbacks of the 1993 reforms—reflected a more conservative approach to 
health insurance. The employer mandate was eliminated before regulations came into 
effect, and community rating criteria were expanded to allow rates to reflect age and 
industry. In addition, individual products were permitted to omit maternity, mental 
health, and substance abuse benefits. Small-group reform was passed in 1996 that allowed 
groups of one to participate in this market, which attracted healthy individuals from the 
individual market into small-group products. Between 1995 and 2000, enrollment in the 
individual insurance market steadily dropped to 134,000. The largest insurer in the 
individual market, Premera Blue Cross Blue Shield, stopped writing new business in 
November 1998. It was followed in early 1999 by Regence and by Group Health 
of Puget Sound, the only other major carriers that sold individual health insurance 
(Exhibit 2). 
 
In 2000, the remaining 1993 reforms were repealed in an effort to attract carriers 
back into the market. Rate regulation was replaced with a minimum medical loss ratio of 
72 percent. Medical underwriting was allowed; a uniform 700-question9 medical 
questionnaire was designed so carriers could reject up to 8 percent of new applicants. As 
well, the preexisting condition exclusion period was extended to nine months. After the 
2000 reforms, the locally domiciled existing carriers resumed writing new business. But its 
enrollment grew to only 157,000 as of 2002, or roughly 23,000 more members than it had 
at its point of lowest enrollment two years before. As of January 2003, no new major 
carriers reentered the market. Market concentration had increased, however, and the 
market share of the top two carriers was 84 percent in 2002 compared to 61 percent in 
1993 (Exhibit 3). This change primarily was caused by the consolidation of locally 
domiciled carriers, although the exit of commercial carriers played a small role. 
 
Washington State created a high-risk pool in 1988. During the period when the 
state prohibited medical underwriting and shortened preexisting condition exclusion 
periods to three months, enrollment in the pool dropped from 4,400 in 1993 to a low of 
712 in 1996. Enrollment began to rise again after the 1995 rollbacks, and reached 2,333 by 
2000. As of 2003, enrollment has not grown beyond 2,500. In the high-risk group—for 
the least expensive product that included maternity, mental health, and prescription drug 
coverage in 2003—premiums ranged between 16 percent of income for a 25-year-old 
male to 70 percent of income for a couple aged 63. These rates are calculated for people 
with an income level equal to 200 percent of the federal poverty level. The premiums are 
generally viewed as unaffordable, despite a state subsidy mechanism that contributes $30 
million to the pool: an average of $12,000 per recipient. Many of the participants in the 
pool have third parties covering their premiums, including the state (for HIV patients who 
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would otherwise be in Medicaid) and a foundation supporting kidney dialysis patients. 
Enrollment in the pool does not come close to the roughly 16,000 people rejected by 
carriers for high scores on the health questionnaire. One survey of a small sample of 
people who were screened out with the health questionnaire indicated that roughly one-
third went into the WSHIP and 27 percent were uninsured. Roughly another 40 percent 
found other insurance either through a family member, a public program, or a new job, or 
they retook the health questionnaire and were accepted into the individual market. 
 
 
Exhibit 1. Enrollment in the Individual Insurance Market 
in the State of Washington 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Group Health Cooperative 
of Puget Sound 
25,915 25,824 24,726 20,519 20,489 22,296 22,943 17,069 19,572 21,066
Premera Blue Cross* 133,254 187,113 199,396 171,811 144,609 104,620 75,493 56,961 70,877 58,407
Regence Blue Shield** 42,862 47,497 48,873 53,795 55,713 55,684 56,382 46,076 56,753 73,771
Other 16,313 19,931 22,591 19,830 16,433 12,860 13,439 14,034 4,525 4,054
Total 218,344 280,365 295,586 265,955 237,244 195,460 168,257 134,140 151,727 157,298
* Enrollments for 1993–1997 include members of Medical Services Corp. of Eastern Washington and Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska. 
The two merged in 1998 to form Premera Blue Cross. 
** Enrollments for 1993–1996 include members of Pierce County Medical Bureau and King County Medical Blue Shield, which merged 
with Regence Blue Shield in 1997. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
 
 
Exhibit 2. Medical Loss Ratios for the Largest Carriers in the Individual 
and Total Insurance Market in the State of Washington 
  Before 1996 1996 1997 1998 1999* 2000 2001 2002
Individual   80.8% 80.0% 80.8% 79.8% 83.4% 83.5%
Premera Blue Cross-WA  
Total  88.8% 86.4% 84.4% 85.6% 85.2% 84.9%
Individual  130.8% 113.5% 90.8% 78.4% 82.8% 81.7% 84.8%
Regence Blue Shield-WA* 
Total 102.3% 84.7% 82.6% 85.3% 85.3% 86.4% 82.1% 82.9%
Individual 123.3% 112.6% 113.5% 98.2% 90.8% 99.4% 97.6% 110.8%Group Health Cooperative 
of Puget Sound-WA Total 96.3% 93.6% 96.8% 95.7% 95.4% 89.9% 85.9% 86.5%
* Premera BCBS stopped writing new individual insurance in 1999, claiming large financial losses due to the individual market regulations. 
Note that the MLRs on individual business are lower than those on the total business. While there are generally higher administrative costs 
associated with the individual business, a 20 percent administrative expense ratio seems more than adequate considering Premera claimed 
that it was making money on the individual line since the 2000 reforms. And yet the post-2000 MLR is several percentage points higher 
after the reforms. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
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Exhibit 3. Concentration in the Individual Insurance Market 
in the State of Washington 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Largest two insurers 61.03% 66.74% 67.46% 64.60% 60.95% 53.30% 78.38% 76.81% 84.12% 84.03%
Smallest 50% of insurers 7.47% 5.10% 5.57% 3.71% 3.45% 3.97% 4.57% 10.46% 2.98% 2.58%
Source: Authors’ analysis of plan documents files and insurance department reports. 
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CASE STUDY: NEW JERSEY 
(State with Stronger Regulation) 
 
Margaret M. Koller, M.S., and Amy M. Tiedemann, Ph.D. 
 
New Jersey’s Individual Health Coverage Program (IHCP) was created from the 
Health Care Reform Act of 1992 and represented the state’s attempt to address access issues 
by restructuring the individual coverage market. These regulations were implemented in 1993, 
and at its peak in 1996, the IHCP boasted an enrollment of over 200,000. However, after a 
surge in the mid-1990s, the IHCP experienced a steep enrollment decline, losing 
membership at a rate of approximately 3 percent per quarter until 2002 when the decline 
began to abate. 
 
Some of the key features of the IHCP include: guaranteed issue and renewal; pure 
community rating;10 standardization of benefit plans; a carrier loss assessment reimbursement 
mechanism; and the creation of the Individual Health Coverage Program Board, an 
independent regulatory body vested with oversight authority. While enrollment trend data 
indicate that the IHCP was successful in its early years (through the mid-1990s), the current 
decline suggests that additional regulatory intervention may once again be necessary to 
stabilize the market. While the steep membership decline has slowed over the recent quarters, 
and many would be reluctant to characterize the market as being in a “death spiral” (a phrase 
frequently used to describe the market in 2002–2003), policy changes may be necessary to 
once again make the IHCP a robust, sustainable market.11 
 
Interviewees agree that the cycle of increasing premiums and decreasing membership 
has left the market unattractive and unaffordable for young, healthy subscribers. While there 
may be agreement among policymakers and other stakeholders with respect to identifying the 
problems in the IHCP, there is considerable debate among these players with regard to the 
market’s overall performance, the priority for policy options, and the general prognosis for the 
future of the non-group market. 
 
Select Features of the IHC Market Reforms 
The Loss Assessment Mechanism. In New Jersey, there has been a steep decline in the number of 
carriers providing coverage in the individual market: from a high of 28 in the initial post-
reform years to nine carriers in 2004. Of the nine carriers, three are responsible for 90 percent 
of the covered lives (Exhibit 1).12 
 
The loss assessment mechanism, a major feature of New Jersey’s 1992 reform 
legislation, is thought to be closely linked to the initially large number of participating carriers 
and the subsequent exodus of many carriers. The goal of the loss assessment was to encourage 
carriers to participate in the individual market by offering a mechanism by which losses above 
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a certain amount would be reimbursed. The regulators wanted to make the market more 
competitive and avoid the continuing scenario of one carrier (in New Jersey’s case, Blue Cross 
Blue Shield) being burdened with all the risk and the title of “payer of last resort.”  The “Play 
or Pay” feature requires that all carriers in New Jersey that sell health insurance are required to 
“play” in the individual market, either by actively selling individual coverage or by “paying” to 
cover the losses incurred by the other carriers that do participate. 
 
Prior to 1997, carriers were reimbursed for their first-dollar losses in the individual 
market, including nonmedical losses. In 1998, the New Jersey legislature amended the carrier 
loss assessment mechanism to require carriers to incur a 115 percent loss, excluding 
nonmedical losses, before they would be eligible for any reimbursement.13 Without this 
financial “carrot,” many of the smaller carriers decided to abandon the market. 
 
 
Exhibit 1. Total Market Share in New Jersey’s 
Individual Health Coverage Program 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Largest carrier 56.3% 62.3% 64.8% 62.4% 60.8% 59.3% 57.5% 
Largest two carriers 63.6% 71.0% 78.2% 81.2% 81.5% 77.5% 74.7% 
Largest five carriers 79.5% 91.0% 95.2% 97.9% 98.0% 97.7% 97.8% 
Source: NJ Department of Banking & Insurance fourth quarter administrative data. 
 
 
Standardization of Plans. One of the key features of the 1992 IHCP reforms was the 
standardization of plan designs to promote administrative simplification and facilitate 
consumer access to coverage. Further, it would allow consumers to comparison shop for 
benefits based on premiums and would not be overwhelmed by carriers offering a multitude 
of plan options (Exhibit 2).14 
 
 
Exhibit 2. Characteristics of the Standard Health Benefits Plans 
 Plan A/50 Plan B Plan C Plan D HMO 
Carrier/Covered 
Person Coinsurance 
50%/50% 60%/40% 70%/30% 80%/20% Carriers have the 
option to cover 
drugs at 50% 
Deductible/ 
Copayment Options 
$1,000/$2,500 $1,000/$2,500 $1,000/$2,500 $500/$1,000 $10/$15/$20/$30
Hospital Copay No Yes-In 
addition to 
deductible 
No No Yes 
Source: New Jersey Individual Health Coverage Insurance Program Buyer’s Guide found at 
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/reform.htm. 
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Basic and Essential Health Plan. In addition to the five plans described above, in January 2003, 
New Jersey implemented its Basic and Essential Health Plan designed to provide “bare bones” 
health coverage to members. With lower premiums and a narrower benefit scope, the plan was 
designed to attract the younger, healthier subscribers and keep some people from completely 
foregoing health insurance. Premiums vary by carrier and can be modified as community 
rated or pure community rated. Rates in 2003 for single Basic and Essential coverage ranged 
from a low of $120 per month to a high of $2,987 per month. Copayments can be quite 
steep—$500 copayment per hospital stay and $100 copayment for an emergency room visit.15 
Through the second quarter of 2004, take-up in this plan has been quite modest, with a total 
enrollment of 1,387 lives. 
 
Potential Policy Options 
The apparent adverse selection spiral that characterized the market in the late 1990s and into 
the beginning of this decade seems to have slowed, with an estimated membership of 77,000 
in the second quarter of 2004.16 IHCP enrollment cycles appear linked to the economic 
employment trends in the state. During the mid- to late-1990s when New Jersey enjoyed an 
economic boom and an increase in employer-sponsored coverage, the individual market 
eroded as people had access to other forms of more affordable health insurance coverage. 
Despite the recent stabilization, most experts agree that this market is still in need of repair. 
This is particularly true considering the fact that at its peak in 1996, the IHCP boasted an 
enrollment of 200,000. The goal of new reforms would be to make the market more 
attractive to younger, healthier people—who may not have access to employer-sponsored 
coverage—by making it more affordable. 
 
Modified community rating and flexibility in plan design appear to be two of the 
more popular and politically viable reform options. However, there has been some additional 
discussion about creating a high-risk pool or some form of reinsurance mechanism to offset 
some of the costs carriers incur for catastrophic cases or merging the individual and small 
group markets. These latter two options, however, were met with greater skepticism by 
interviewees. 
 
Regardless of which strategy for modification is pursued, a complete dismantling of 
the current IHCP structure seems unlikely and trade-offs will be necessary for reform to 
move forward and be successful. 
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NOTES 
 
1 In our interview with this individual, we promised not to reveal the exact percent. 
2 Based on a 1994 law, carriers must pool experience for closed and open blocks in setting 
premium rates, to prevent carriers from closing blocks of business as a means of “cleaning up” their 
individual plans. 
3 There were virtually no data available on the individual health market in Kansas: The 
insurance department had no enrollment history and virtually no information about the financial 
results of individual carriers. 
4 In response to the 1994 reforms, Anthem designed an association product, through its 
relationship with the local Farm Bureau, and sent roughly 30,000 healthy new enrollees to the 
Farm Bureau association for cheaper coverage until the time the 1998 rollbacks took effect. 
5 Forty percent of the privately insured market was self-insured; total population was only 
4 million. 
6 Under the state’s small-group law adopted in 1991, small-group carriers were required to 
provide coverage on a guaranteed-issue basis to small groups with 1–25 employees (the self-
employed were the so-called groups of one). In contrast, carriers in the individual market, other 
than BCBS, were allowed to medically underwrite, including rejecting applicants or imposing 
permanent exclusions for preexisting conditions. Self-employed individuals and even some small 
groups took advantage of these different underwriting requirements to obtain coverage in the 
market most advantageous to them. Healthy people purchased individual coverage; people with 
health problems sought small-group coverage. 
7 This was a part of a conversation about the interaction between small-group and individual 
markets, in particular, the role associations play in retaining healthy members while finding ways 
to get unhealthy members out of their risk pools. Association business (such as chambers of 
commerce) and MET business (multiple employer trust) are rated as a large group and is not 
subject to community rating. Some of these groups have employees or members fill out the health 
survey and put employees into separate “pods” for costing purposes. Then they rapidly increase 
the rates on the high-cost “pods.” 
8 A. M. Kirk, “Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington, 
Kentucky, and Massachusetts,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 25 (February 2000): 133–73. 
9 If you could answer “no” to the 10 basic questions, you did not have to answer the 
remaining 690. 
10 Guaranteed issue and renewal states that an eligible person is guaranteed health insurance 
coverage in the IHCP regardless of health status. There is a 12-month waiting period for 
preexisting conditions, though members will continue to receive coverage for conditions unrelated 
to their preexisting condition. Community rating means that the same premiums will apply to all 
people who purchase the identical IHCP plan. There can be no premium differentiation based on 
age, sex, gender, occupation, geography, or health status. Additional detail on these definitions can 
be found at http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/bgihc98.htm#DESCRIP. 
11 J. C. Cantor et al., “Non-Group Health Insurance in New Jersey,” Facts & Findings (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Center for State Health Policy, July 2004); A. C. Monheit, J. C. Cantor, 
M. Koller, and K. S. Fox, “Community Rating and Sustainable Individual Health Insurance 
Markets in New Jersey,” Health Affairs 23 (July/August 2004): 167–75. 
12 NJDOBI 2004 administrative data. 
13 Monheit et al., “Community Rating,” 2004. 
14 Cantor et al., “Non-Group Health,” 2004. 
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15 New Jersey Individual Health Coverage Insurance Program Buyer’s Guide found at 
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/reform.htm. 
16 The second quarter 2004 enrollment number is relatively unchanged since second quarter 
2003. In fact, the decline slowed to below 2 percent per quarter beginning in 2002 and the 
decrease slipped even lower in 2003. Source: NJDOBI administrative data. 
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